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Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, natural resources have proven an adequate replacement for 
external funding of armed conflicts. The prospects for parties to an armed conflict to gain ‘easy’ 
profits from resource exploitation encourage these parties to engage in predatory practices that 
are highly detrimental to environmental conservation. The environmental degradation caused 
by predatory resource exploitation by parties to an armed conflict also severely hampers efforts 
towards the post-conflict reconstruction of a State. Environmental degradation of land may 
spark new tensions in the fragile phase of post-conflict reconstruction. In addition, natural 
resources are an important engine to restart the economy of a war-torn State after the conflict 
has come to an end. If the resources are severely degraded or even exhausted as a consequence 
of their exploitation during armed conflict, it becomes even more difficult to kick-start the 
economy of a State emerging from conflict. This article argues that current international law is 
not sufficiently equipped to deal with these challenges. The existing regulatory framework is 
fragmented and imprecise. It is only through case specific responses under Security Council 
sanctions regimes that the challenges are currently addressed.
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1. Introduction
The exploitation of natural resources in order to finance an armed conflict is today 
one of the most prevalent causes of environmental damage during armed conflict.1 
Extensive logging by all parties to the armed conflict in Cambodia, for example, 
*) LL.M., M.A.The author expresses gratitude to Prof. Nico Schrijver, Dr. Erik Koppe and the 
anonymous reviewer for providing useful comments on a draft of this paper.
1) Cf. K. Hulme, ‘Environmental Security: Implications for International Law’, 19 Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) p. 15.
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significantly diminished the country’s forest cover.2 Likewise, highly organised 
and systematic exploitation activities within and around United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage sites 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo), including ivory poaching, 
logging and mining, have posed a significant threat to the integrity of these biodi-
versity reserves.3 Similarly, substantial diamond mining during the conflict in 
Sierra Leone caused extensive land degradation. Exhausted mining sites were not 
rehabilitated, resulting in severe environmental degradation.4
Although unsustainable patterns of resource exploitation are not specific to the 
situation of armed conflict only, the examples above show that resource exploi-
tation during an armed conflict poses a special threat to the environment. The 
prospects for parties to an armed conflict to gain ‘easy’ profits from resource 
exploitation, either in order to finance their armed struggle or for their personal 
benefit, encourage these parties to resort to destructive exploitation methods that 
are highly detrimental to environmental conservation.
This article explores the issue of predatory behaviour by parties to an armed 
conflict5 which causes severe damage to the very natural resources that are the 
basis for development. The principal question addressed concerns the role that 
international law should play in addressing this problem. This article argues that 
international law should first and foremost provide an adequate legal framework 
to govern the exploitation of natural resources during armed conflict. This is cur-
rently not the case. Rather, the existing international legal framework is both frag-
mented and imprecise. It is posited that this is problematic because it provides 
parties to an armed conflict with possibilities to bypass the few rules that are in 
place.
A second role that international law should play is to provide structural 
solutions to break the link between natural resources and armed conflict. It is 
argued that this is an essential part of the process of conflict resolution and 
peace-building. This article focuses on the role of the Security Council in address-
ing these issues. Sanctions have been the prevalent tool used by the Security 
Council to address predatory resource exploitation in recent armed conflicts.6 
2) For more details on the links between logging and the armed conflict in Cambodia, see P. Le 
Billon and S. Springer, ‘Between War and Peace: Violence and Accommodation in the 
Cambodian Logging Sector’, in W. de Jong, D. Donovan and K. Abe (eds.), Extreme Conflict and 
Tropical Forests (Springer, New York, 2007) pp. 17–36.
3) Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2002/565, paras. 50 and 52.
4) See UNEP, Sierra Leone: Environment, Conflict and Peacebuilding Assessment, February 2010, 
p. 45.
5) Ballentine and Nitzschke refer in this regard to ‘resource predation’. See K. Ballentine and 
H. Nitzschke (eds.), Profiting from Peace: Managing the Resource Dimensions of Civil War (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Boulder 2005) p. 2.
6) Direct commodity sanctions have been imposed inter alia in the conflicts in Angola, Sierra 
Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, while ancillary sanctions (asset freezes and travel bans against 
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These sanctions regimes have increasingly moved away from direct crisis manage-
ment to more systematic approaches aimed at breaking the link between natural 
resources and armed conflict. This article embraces this development and argues 
in favour of an enhanced role for the Security Council in this regard.
The following section discusses the role of natural resources in fuelling armed 
conflict. Sections 3 and 4 examine the regulatory framework for the exploitation 
of natural resources during armed conflict. In section  5 this article examines 
the structural approach adopted by the Security Council in some of its recent 
sanctions regimes aimed at breaking the link between natural resources and 
armed conflict. Since most of the armed conflicts in which predatory resource 
exploitation take place are internal in nature, this article focuses exclusively on 
these conflicts.
2. The Role of Natural Resources in Fuelling Armed Conflicts
Natural resources are at the heart of many present-day armed conflicts. Examples 
include the conflicts in Cambodia, Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1990s 
and the ongoing conflicts in the DR Congo and Côte d’Ivoire. Even if these con-
flicts are not strictly motivated by the drive to obtain access to lucrative natural 
resources, natural resources have played a major role in sustaining these armed 
conflicts.7 In this way, they have helped shape the dynamics of these conflicts.
In some cases, natural resources have proven to be an adequate replacement for 
Cold War funding by the major superpowers. This may be illustrated by the armed 
conflict in Cambodia between 1979 and 1991. For a long time, this conflict was 
funded through the support of other States. The Soviet Union sponsored the gov-
ernment side, while China and the United States funded the ousted Khmer Rouge 
regime. It was only after these revenues had started to dry up that natural resources 
came into the picture. Both the government and the Khmer Rouge started logging 
timber to fund their armed struggle.8 The conflict in Angola between 1975 and 
2002 is also illustrative. During the Cold War, the Angolan government received 
funding from the Soviet Union and Cuba, while the opposing National Union for 
the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) received funding from the United 
States, France and South Africa. From the early 1990s on, the government switched 
to oil, while UNITA discovered diamonds as a new source of revenue.9
persons implicated in predatory resource exploitation) have been imposed in the conflict 
within the DR Congo.
7) See e.g. K. Ballentine and J. Sherman (eds.), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond 
Greed and Grievance (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 2003); Ballentine and Nitzschke (eds.), 
supra note 5.
8) See Le Billon and Springer, supra note 2, pp. 17–36.
9) See Ballentine and Sherman, supra note 7, pp. 23–24.
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In other cases, the role of natural resources during the conflict evolved from a 
mere source of funding into a motivation to continue fighting. Gaining control 
over the Sierra Leonean diamond fields, for example, became one of the principal 
aims of the opposing Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in the conflict that raged through Sierra Leone 
in the 1990s, especially in the final phase of the conflict.10 After the conflict, the 
leaders of both armed groups were charged before the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone for sharing a “common plan, purpose or design (joint criminal enterprise) 
which was to take any actions necessary to gain and exercise political power and 
control over the territory of Sierra Leone, in particular the diamond mining 
areas”.11 Likewise, obtaining access to lucrative minerals in the DR Congo contin-
ues to be a motivation for armed groups fighting in the eastern provinces of the 
DR Congo today.12
Natural resource revenues constitute an important source of income for rebel 
groups and the government alike. In the conflict in the DR Congo, for example, 
minerals provide both the rebel groups and the government with an important 
source of income to fund their military campaign.13 Likewise, in the conflict in 
Côte d’Ivoire, diamonds provided the rebel groups with income, while the govern-
ment funded its military campaign through cocoa and coffee.14 Other examples 
include Angola (oil and diamonds), Cambodia (timber and gemstones) and Sierra 
Leone (diamonds). Although it is often difficult to establish the extent to which 
resource exploitation by States is used directly to fund an armed conflict, reports 
by relevant UN Panels of Experts have demonstrated the existence of a 
link between resource revenues and military expenditure. In the case of Côte 
d’Ivoire, for example, the UN Group of Experts established a clear link between 
10) Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Witness to Truth, 
Volume 3b: Chapter 1: Mineral Resources, their Use and their Impact on the Conflict and 
the Country, available through <www.sierra-leone.org/TRCDocuments.html>, visited on 31 July 
2012.
11) See the indictment in the case of The Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (RUF Case), Case 
No. SCSL-2004-15-PT, para. 36; and the indictment in the case of The Prosecutor v. Brima, 
Kamara and Kanu (AFRC Case), Case No. SCSL-2004-65-PT, para. 33, both before the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone.
12) See the Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo prepared 
pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1896 (2009), UN Doc. S/2010/596 of 
29 November 2010, p. 76, where the Group of Experts comes to the conclusion that “economic 
motivations are increasingly driving a significant portion of armed actors”.
13) See the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2001/357 of 12 April 
2001 and the Addendum to the Report, UN Doc. S/2001/1072 of 13 November 2001.
14) Midterm report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph 11 of Security 
Council resolution 1842 (2008), UN Doc. S/2009/188 of 8 April 2009; Final report of the Group of 
Experts on Côte d’Ivoire, prepared in accordance with paragraph 14 of Security Council Resolution 
1980 (2011), UN Doc. S/2012/196 of 14 April 2012.
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natural resources, in particular cocoa, and extra-budgetary military spending by 
the Ivorian government.15
Resource exploitation by parties to an armed conflict is not carried out solely to 
obtain revenues to fund the armed conflict. There are also cases in which natural 
resource exploitation is undertaken for the personal benefit of individuals. A 
report of the Group of Experts on the DR Congo, for example, reveals that exploi-
tation activities are carried out both by armed groups and by factions within the 
Congolese army for their personal enrichment.16 Thus, it is often difficult or even 
impossible to make neat distinctions between resource exploitation for the pur-
pose of funding an armed conflict and for the personal benefit of members of 
armed groups. The two purposes are often inextricably linked.
While all of these activities keep the armed conflict ongoing, both the actors 
involved and their motivations have implications for the rules that apply to 
specific instances of predatory resource exploitation. With this in mind, the 
following sections examine the existing legal framework for the exploitation of 
natural resources during armed conflict.
3. General Remarks on the Applicability of Various Sets of Rules
In order to properly understand the legal framework governing the exploitation of 
natural resources during armed conflict, this section discusses the interplay 
between the different fields of international law that shape the legal framework. 
These fields include international humanitarian, environmental, human rights 
and general international law.
First of all, international humanitarian law, the law which is designed specifi-
cally to regulate the situation of armed conflict, provides two basic rules. Protection 
of the environment and natural resources under this field of international law is 
provided primarily through provisions on the protection of civilian objects and of 
property. The most relevant provisions relate to the protection of objects indis-
pensable to the survival of the civilian population (Article 14 of Additional Protocol 
II); and the prohibition of pillage (Article 4(2)(g) of Additional Protocol II to the 
Geneva Conventions). Moreover, additional protection is provided through the 
15) See e.g. the Report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolu-
tion 1584 (2005), UN Doc. S/2005/699, paras. 22–42. See also the Final Report of the Group of 
Experts on Côte d’Ivoire, prepared in accordance with paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 
1980 (2011), supra note 14, paras. 92–95 for a link between natural resources and violations of the 
arms embargo by the Ivorian government.
16) See the Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
prepared pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1896 (2009), supra note 12, 
pp. 47–76.
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prohibition on the destruction or seizure of the property of the adversary, derived 
from Article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Regulations. This prohibition is not expressly 
codified for internal armed conflicts, but its application to these conflicts may be 
derived from international criminal law (Article 8(2)(e)(xii) of the 2002 
International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute).17
In addition, international environmental, human rights and general interna-
tional law, although not designed specifically to deal with situations of armed con-
flict, also provide relevant rules.18 These fields of international law apply at 
all times, including during armed conflict. Yet, in those cases where international 
humanitarian law provides relevant rules, international environmental, human 
rights and general international law are set aside. This is due to the status of 
international humanitarian law as the prevailing lex specialis during an armed 
conflict.19
However, this is not to say that these fields of international law lose their 
relevance entirely. Where international humanitarian law does contain relevant 
rules, international environmental, human rights and general international 
law continue to play a role in the background as other rules of international law 
which must be taken into account in the interpretation of international humani-
tarian law provisions on the basis of Article 31(1) and (3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.20 On the basis of Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention, international environmental, human rights and general international 
law can be taken into account in order to clarify the ordinary meaning of the terms 
of international humanitarian law provisions. In addition, Article 31(3)(c) of 
the Vienna Convention prescribes that treaty provisions are to be interpreted 
in the light of other rules of international law applicable between the parties to 
the treaty.
17) A more detailed discussion of these provisions follows.
18) The recently adopted ILC articles on the effects of armed conflict on treaties formulate a 
presumption of continued applicability of international environmental and human rights trea-
ties. See Draft articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties, with commentaries, adopted at 
the 63rd session of the ILC (2011).
19) On the interplay between international humanitarian law and other fields of law during 
armed conflicts, see the following documents related to the ILC study on the effects of armed 
conflict on treaties: Second report on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties by Ian Brownlie, 
Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/570, 16 June 2006, para. 41 and the Third report on the 
effects of armed conflicts on treaties by Ian Brownlie, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/578, 
paras. 29–31 and 49–55; Effects of Armed Conflict on Treaties, Comments and information received 
from Governments, UN Doc. A/CN.4/622, 15 March 2010; the Memorandum of the UN Secretariat 
on the Effect of Armed Conflict on Treaties: an Examination of Practice and Doctrine, UN Doc. A/
CN.4/550 of 1 February 2005.
20) Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose”. Article 31(3)(c) determines that, “[t]here 
shall be taken into account, together with the context: … any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties”.
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Relevant rules from international environmental, human rights and general 
international law include the principle of sustainable development and related 
principles, such as sustainable use, equity and good governance.21 Another impor-
tant principle, derived from state sovereignty and the right of peoples to self-
determination, is the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
and the corresponding obligation to use natural resources for national develop-
ment and the well-being of the people. This principle has found expression in the 
landmark Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and 
has also been laid down in identical Articles 1(2) of the 1966 International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).22 This provision formulates a right for 
peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources as well as a prohibition to 
deprive peoples of their means of subsistence. This prohibition applies in all 
circumstances.
4. Legal Framework for Resource Exploitation during Armed Conflict
The current section examines the legal framework for the exploitation of natural 
resources during internal armed conflicts. The objectives of this section are to 
determine the extent to which the current legal framework addresses the issue of 
predatory resource exploitation and to establish the weaknesses of the current 
framework.
For this purpose, this section focuses first of all on the basic rules of interna-
tional humanitarian law relating to the exploitation of natural resources that 
apply to all parties to an internal armed conflict, whether rebel groups or the 
national army. In addition, the current section examines the extent to which 
peacetime law closes the gaps left open by the international humanitarian law 
rules.
4.1. International Humanitarian Law
International humanitarian law does not contain specialised rules governing the 
exploitation of natural resources. Nonetheless, it does contain some rules that are 
21) See in this regard the ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to 
Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/57/329 of 31 August 2002, which distinguishes seven prin-
ciples relating to sustainable development. For a recent analysis of international case-law rel-
evant to the principles of sustainable development, see the 2010 Hague Conference Report of the 
ILA Committee on International Law on Sustainable Development, available through <www 
.ila-hq.org>, visited on 26 March 2012.
22) For the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, see UN General 
Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), adopted on 14 December 1962. For a detailed analysis of the 
genesis of this principle as well as its contents, see N.J. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997).
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relevant to the issue of natural resource exploitation. These are the prohibition on 
the taking or destruction of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population (Article 14(2) of Additional Protocol II); the prohibition of pillage 
(Article 4(2)(g) of Additional Protocol II) and the prohibition on the seizure or 
destruction of the property of the adversary (derived from Article 23(g) of the 1907 
Hague Regulations). It is posited in this regard that natural resources may consti-
tute property, since they are capable of ownership.
It is to be noted that the prohibition on taking or destroying objects 
indis pensable to the survival of the civilian population and the prohibition 
of pillage are laid down in Additional Protocol II,23 which is applicable to 
internal armed conflicts between government troops on the one side and 
one or more organised armed groups on the other. Internal armed conflicts 
which do not involve government armed forces or otherwise do not reach 
the threshold set by Additional Protocol II are governed by the rules formu-
lated   in   common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions24 and by customary 
inter national  law.
In this regard, it should be noted that Article 3 contains an obligation of 
humane treatment. This obligation may be interpreted as a prohibition on 
depriving the population of their basic needs for survival. It thus resembles the 
prohibition contained in Article 14 of Additional Protocol II. In addition, the pro-
hibition of pillage has attained the status of customary international law.25  
As such, it also applies to armed conflicts that do not satisfy the criteria set 
by Additional Protocol II. Thus, in practice, the regulatory regime for conflicts 
reaching the threshold of Additional Protocol II and those that do not, is quite 
similar.
23) In this regard, Article 4(2)(g) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, adopted 
on 8 June 1977 (1125 UNTS 609), determines that pillage against persons who do not take a direct 
part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities remains prohibited at any time and in any 
place whatsoever. Article 14(2) of Additional Protocol II stipulates that “[s]tarvation of civilians 
as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or 
render useless, for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, 
such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking 
water installations and supplies and irrigation works.” Both provisions are discussed in more 
detail in the following sections.
24) Article 3, which is common to all four Geneva Conventions, adopted on 12 August 1949 
(75 UNTS 287), contains a set of minimum rules applicable in internal armed conflicts aimed at 
protecting the human dignity of persons not taking part in hostilities.
25) Both the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY and the Special Court for Sierra Leone have 
expressly held the prohibition of pillage to be part of customary law applicable to non- 
international armed conflict. Hadzihasanovic, Alagic and Kubura (IT-01-47), ICTY, 11 March 
2005, Decision on Joint Defence Interlocutory Appeal of Trial Chamber Decision on 
Rule 98bis Motions for Acquittal, para. 37; The Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana and 
Allieu Kondewa, Special Court for Sierra Leone, 28 May 2008, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 
para. 390.
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4.1.1. Prohibition to Take or Destroy Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the 
Civilian Population
Article 14 of Additional Protocol II prohibits parties to an armed conflict to “attack, 
destroy, remove or render useless” objects that may be considered indispensable 
to the survival of the population. This prohibition is subject to the overarching 
prohibition on starving the civilian population. This implies that the prohibition 
on taking or destroying objects that are indispensable to the civilian popu-
lation  requires some form of intent on behalf of the perpetrator to do harm to the 
civilian population. Arguably, this intent may take the form of direct intent or 
of reckless disregard by a party to an armed conflict for the consequences of its 
actions.
Article 14 of Additional Protocol II provides a safety net for the population of a 
State mixed up in an internal armed conflict, which secures their right to retain 
access to the basic needs for survival. The provision is generally understood to 
provide protection to parts of the environment that supply the population with 
foodstuffs and other primary goods necessary for their survival.26 Thus, in the first 
instance it prohibits practices like the targeting of water supply systems and the 
destruction of crops, as, for example, reportedly done by the rebel group RUF dur-
ing the conflict in Sierra Leone.27
A question of interest in this regard is whether and to what extent the prohibi-
tion covers valuable natural resources. Can valuable natural resources be consid-
ered ‘indispensable to the survival of the population’? Although this seems 
far-fetched at first blush, it must be remembered that many civilians in conflict 
regions are highly dependent on particular natural resources to generate a basic 
income. In fact, it seems that the dependency of the local population on artisanal 
mining in the DR Congo constituted one of the principal reasons for the Security 
Council to abstain from imposing commodity sanctions to curb the trade in natu-
ral resources originating from the DR Congo.28
It is posited here that the phrase ‘objects indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian population’ in Article 14 of Additional Protocol II should be interpreted 
extensively to cover natural resources that provide a basic income for the local 
population. This can be achieved through an interpretation of Article 14 of 
Additional Protocol II in the light of identical Article 1(2) of the ICESCR and 
26) Article 14 of Additional Protocol II contains a non-exhaustive list of objects which are con-
sidered indispensable to the survival of the population, including “food-stuffs, agricultural 
areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and sup-
plies and irrigation works”.
27) UNEP, Sierra Leone, Environment, Conflict and Peacebuilding Assessment, Technical Report, 
February 2010, p. 45.
28) A report prepared by the Secretary-General had warned against the negative impacts of 
such sanctions on the local population. See the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to 
paragraph 8 of resolution 1698 (2006) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. 
S/2007/68 of 8 February 2007, paras. 62–63.
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the ICCPR. This provision determines that a people may not be deprived of its 
own means of subsistence. An interpretation of Article 14 of Additional Protocol 
II in light of Article 1(2) of the ICESCR and the ICCPR would therefore extend 
the protection provided by the provision to all objects which provide the popula-
tion with the means of subsistence, including particular natural resources that 
generate a basic income for the local population. Following this interpretation, 
parties to an armed conflict may, under certain circumstances, be prohibited from 
cutting-off the civilian population from the mining sites or forests under their 
control.
4.1.2. Prohibition of Pillage
Article 4(2)(g) of Additional Protocol II formulates a prohibition of pillage. This 
prohibition traditionally applies to acts of theft, either by individual soldiers or 
through forms of organised plundering.29 The provision is sufficiently broad to 
capture all types of natural resources, whether state-owned or privately-held; 
extracted natural resources or forests and mines; as well as rights relating to the 
exploitation of natural resources, such as concessions.30
Nonetheless, the prohibition contains some important restrictions. These 
restrictions are not explicit in the provision, but may be derived from interna-
tional criminal law. The Elements of Crime that define the crimes listed in the ICC 
Statute restrict pillage to appropriation for private or personal use.31 In 
section  2 above it was argued that the exploitation of natural resources by 
parties to an armed conflict may serve two purposes. Natural resources are 
either exploited to fund an armed conflict or for the personal benefit of individu-
als. In the latter case, the requirement of appropriation for private or personal use 
is easily satisfied. Thus, the prohibition of pillage may be said to apply to acts of 
predatory resource exploitation by members of rebel groups or the national army 
for their personal gain.
It is also within this context that the prohibition of pillage was applied by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of the DR Congo against Uganda. 
29) See the Commentary to the Additional Protocols, p. 1376; and G. Carducci, ‘Pillage’, in R. 
Bernhardt, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Max Planck Institute for Comparative 
Public Law and International Law (Heidelberg and Oxford University Press, 2012).
30) The prohibition of pillage applies to property. According to the Commentary to the 
Additional Protocols, p. 1376, this includes both State-owned and private property as well as 
immovable and movable property. In addition, the Nuremberg Tribunals have extended its 
scope to physical and intangible property. See the I.G. Farben case, Trials of War Criminals before 
the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, vol. VIII (1952), p. 1134.
31) Elements of Crimes, Official Journal of the International Criminal Court, available at <www 
.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Element_of_Crimes_English.pdf>, visited on 1 August 
2012. See further K. Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary (International Committee of the Red Cross, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002).
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In this case, the DR Congo contended that members of the Ugandan army had 
systematically exploited the DRC’s natural resources for their personal benefit.32 
The International Court of Justice concluded that “whenever members of the 
UPDF were involved in the looting, plundering and exploitation of natural 
resources in the territory of the DRC”, they acted in violation of the prohibition of 
pillage.33
However, fitting resource exploitation for the purpose of funding an armed con-
flict into the definition of pillage is far more problematic. An interpretation that 
confines pillage to the appropriation of natural resources for private or personal 
use seems to exclude from the definition of pillage the exploitation of natural 
resources for the purpose of funding an armed conflict.
This is at least true for the government that uses resource revenues to fund its 
military campaign. After all, military expenditure constitutes by definition a pub-
lic purpose. For rebel groups this may be different. The application of pillage to 
resource exploitation by rebel groups for the purpose of funding an armed conflict 
may depend on the qualification of the armed struggle itself. Is the struggle ideo-
logically motivated or is it primarily motivated by self-interest? This makes it a 
very difficult issue to deal with in abstracto.
Unfortunately, specific case law from modern international criminal tribunals 
applying the war crime of pillage to the exploitation of natural resources is lack-
ing. Until now, none of these tribunals have applied the provision to instances of 
natural resource exploitation. Notwithstanding the potential of the war crime to 
capture these instances, counts of pillage before modern international criminal 
tribunals have been confined to the appropriation of personal belongings of civil-
ians, mostly in relation to the raiding of villages.34 Even in the cases against Charles 
Taylor and the leaders of the RUF and the AFRC before the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, where there was a close nexus between the exploitation of natural resources 
and the committing of other crimes, pillage of natural resources was not among 
the charges.35
In the absence of case law which may provide more specific guidance to 
the interpretation of pillage in relation to natural resources, it may be concluded 
in general that the prohibition of pillage applies first and foremost to the 
32) Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
I.C.J., 19 December 2005, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, paras. 222–229.
33) Ibid., para. 245.
34) For examples of relevant practice by international criminal tribunals, see the ICRC 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Database, Rule 52, available through <www.icrc 
.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home>, visited on 27 January 2012.
35) For a detailed discussion of the crime of pillage and its applicability to the exploitation of 
natural resources, see L. J. van den Herik and D. A. Dam-de Jong, ‘Revitalizing the Antique 
WarCrime of Pillage: The Potential and Pitfalls of Using International Criminal Law to Address 
Illegal Resource Exploitation During Armed Conflict’, 22:3 Criminal Law Forum (2011) 
pp. 237–273.
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exploitation of natural resources for purposes of self-enrichment. It seems less 
appropriate to apply the prohibition to exploitation for the purposes of funding 
an armed conflict. These instances may however be covered by the prohibition to 
destroy or seize the property of the adversary, which is discussed in the following 
section.
4.1.3. Prohibition to Destroy or Seize the Property of the Adversary
Whereas the prohibition of pillage relates to the appropriation of property for per-
sonal use, the prohibition on ‘seizing’ the property of the adversary relates to the 
appropriation of property for public purposes. This may be exemplified by the 
Commentary to the prohibition of pillage, which states that the latter prohibition 
“leaves intact the right of requisition or seizure”.36 In addition, the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone has explicitly confirmed that ‘seizure’ relates to the appropriation 
of property for public purposes.37
In addition, the prohibition covers the destruction of property, bringing some 
forms of environmental damage within its ambit. Both the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone and the International Criminal Court have addressed instances of the burn-
ing of property as falling within the definition of destruction.38 This implies, for 
example, that the burning of parts of a forest to clear mining sites or for large-scale 
timber extraction may fall within the ambit of the prohibition.
The prohibition is based on Article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which 
formulates a prohibition on the destruction or seizure of enemy property unless 
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Unfortunately, an express provi-
sion for internal armed conflicts is lacking. Its applicability to internal armed con-
flicts may nonetheless be derived from Article 8(2)(e)(xii) of the ICC Statute, 
which criminalises the destruction and seizure of the property of an adversary.
However, the provision contains considerable impediments. A first relates to 
the condition that the property must belong to the adversary. This condition in 
fact limits the material scope of the war crime considerably. The question of own-
ership of natural resources is determined through national law. Many national 
constitutions vest the ownership of natural resources in the State. Therefore, the 
prohibition would primarily apply to rebel groups exploiting natural resources 
belonging to the State or to persons affiliated to the State.
Another impediment relates to the exception of military necessity. The prohibi-
tion on the destruction or seizure of the property of an adversary does not apply 
36) J. Pictet and O. M. Uhler, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: commentary, Part 4 on the 
Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, Geneva: 
International Committee of the Red Cross (1958), p. 227.
37) See The Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
supra note 22, para. 392, note 770.
38) The Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, supra note 22, para. 389. See further 
the Warrants of Arrest issued on 27 April 2007 by the ICC in the cases against Harun and 
Kushayb in relation to the conflict in Sudan.
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in cases of military necessity. In relation to natural resources, this prohibition may 
be understood as authorising acts of exploitation if strictly necessary to overcome 
the adversary.39 Although the exception of military necessity may thus only be 
invoked in extreme circumstances, it may not be ruled out entirely that the excep-
tion covers exploitation for the purposes of financing an armed conflict. This 
seems at least the case when resource revenues are used to satisfy the primary 
needs of members of armed groups, such as food, clothing and shelter.
Unfortunately, there is no relevant case law elaborating on these questions. 
Most of the existing case law with respect to the prohibition on the destruction or 
seizure of the property of an adversary relates to the destruction of property, in 
particular of houses and other property belonging to civilians.40
In conclusion, the prohibition on the destruction or seizure of the property of 
the adversary may be regarded as the counterpart of the prohibition of pillage. 
The latter formulates a prohibition for parties to an armed conflict to appropriate 
property for personal interests while the former relates to appropriation for public 
purposes. The prohibition on the destruction or seizure of the property of the 
adversary applies first and foremost to exploitation of natural resources by rebel 
groups. It prohibits exploitation unless there is a military necessity to do so. The 
scope of the prohibition thus depends in particular on the contents of the excep-
tion of military necessity in relation to the exploitation of natural resources.
4.2. Peacetime Law
The previous section demonstrated that international humanitarian law contains 
a few elementary rules relating to the exploitation of natural resources. These 
rules apply first and foremost to rebel groups exploiting natural resources. The 
rules seem less apt to cover the exploitation of natural resources by the domestic 
State in times of armed conflict, except when members of the national army 
exploit natural resources for their personal benefit.
However, this does not imply that a State is entitled to exploit the domestic 
natural resources as it sees fit. According to the general framework set out in 
section  3, peacetime law continues to apply, unless these rules are set aside by 
39) Consider in this regard the Hostage case, where the Nuremberg Military Tribunal held in 
relation to the destruction of property that the Hague Regulations require the military 
necessity to be “urgent” and that there must be a “reasonable connection between the destruc-
tion of property and the overcoming of the enemy forces”. The Tribunal also recognised that 
destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law. Hostage case, Trials of 
War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 
Nuremberg, October 1946–April 1949, Vol. XI, Washington: Government Printing Office (1959), 
pp. 1253–1254.
40) For examples of cases before criminal tribunals, see the ICRC Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Database under Rule 50, available through <www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/
eng/docs/home>, visited on 6 August 2012.
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more specific rules of international humanitarian law. In section 4.1 it was demon-
strated that international humanitarian law does not contain specific rules to deal 
with natural resource exploitation by States participating in internal armed con-
flicts. Therefore, arguably, the peacetime framework for the exploitation of natu-
ral resources continues to apply in these circumstances.
The key rules that apply to the exploitation of natural resources by States ensue 
from the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources which is 
recognised by the International Court of Justice as a principle of customary law.41 
Pursuant to this principle, natural resource ownership is vested within each State 
and people.42 A government, as the legal representative of a State and its people,43 
is thus entitled to exploit domestic natural resources.
Nonetheless, this right entails duties as well.44 First of all, States must exploit 
natural resources in a sustainable way. This condition ensues from the principle of 
sustainable use, which has been embodied in numerous international environ-
mental treaties that qualify the rights of a State to dispose of their natural resources 
for the purposes of environmental protection. Suspension of the operation of 
these treaties – if possible at all – is not likely to affect the obligations contained 
therein, at least in as far as these treaties aim to protect the common interests of 
the international community. This is, for example, the case for the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, which qualifies the conservation of biological diversity as a 
“common concern of humankind”.45 Thus, large scale logging “with little regard 
41) See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Uganda), supra note 29, para. 244.
42) For a more thorough discussion of the principle of permanent sovereignty and the 
holders of the rights related to it, see Schrijver, supra note 21. For an analysis of the principle 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources within the specific context of resource 
related armed conflicts, see P. N. Okowa, ‘Natural Resources in Situations of Armed Conflict: 
Is there a Coherent Framework for Protection?’, 9 International Community Law Review (2007) 
pp. 237–262; and D. A. Dam-de Jong, ‘International Law and Resource Plunder: The Protection 
of Natural Resources during Armed Conflict’, in O. K. Fauchald, D. Hunter and W. Xi (eds.), 
19 Yearbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) 
pp. 27–57.
43) A government is generally presumed to be the legal representative of a State, unless it is no 
longer recognised as such. In this regard it is interesting to mention the example of Libya. Not 
long after the beginning of the insurrection in February 2011, the international community 
started to recognise the insurrectional movement as the legitimate representative of the Libyan 
people and thus as the new government entitled to decide on the oil reserves of the country. 
This example shows that a government may lose its status as the legal representative of a State 
due to its course of actions during an armed conflict.
44) See Schrijver, supra note 21.
45) See the preamble of the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted on 5 June 1992 (1760 
UNTS 79) which “affirm[s] that the conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of 
humankind”. Of course, there may be other impediments to observation of the obligations con-
tained within such treaties. The Biodiversity Convention, for example, makes implementation 
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to sustainable forest practices”, such as happened in Liberia under Charles 
Taylor, is not permitted.46
Second, States must exploit the domestic natural resources for the benefit of 
the population. This condition ensues first of all from the Declaration on 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources.47 It has since been reaffirmed in 
several legal instruments, including resolutions of the Security Council dealing 
with the inter-linkage between natural resources and armed conflict.48 Of course, 
using the proceeds of resource exploitation to fight rebel forces may perfectly well 
fit into this description. However, a State that uses the proceeds of natural resource 
exploitation to commit gross human rights violations may be said to act contrary 
to the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.
The armed conflict in Libya in 2011 provides a relevant example. During this 
conflict, the government of Libya, led by Colonel Qadhafi, carried out large-scale 
and systematic attacks against the civilian population. In response, the Security 
Council imposed an asset freeze against the Libyan authorities, which included 
the assets of the Libyan National Oil Corporation as a “potential source of funding 
for [Qadhafi’s] regime”.49
Furthermore, States must respect resolutions adopted by the Security Council, 
pursuant to Article 25 of the UN Charter. Some of these resolutions contain addi-
tional measures to be implemented by governments, restricting their right to 
freely dispose of the State’s natural resources.50 Relevant measures include the 
establishment of a certificate of origin regime for natural resources, such as for 
rough diamonds originating from Sierra Leone and Liberia, or the implementa-
tion of a system aimed at promoting transparency and accountability in particular 
natural resources sectors, such as for the timber industry in Liberia.51 These meas-
ures are discussed in section 5 below.
of most of its obligations conditional on the conditions and capabilities of the implementing 
State.
46) Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia established pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1343 (2001), paragraph 19, concerning Liberia, UN Doc. S/2001/1015 of 26 October 2001, 
para. 33.
47) See the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 1803 (XVII), adopted on 14 December 1962.
48) See e.g. UN Security Council Resolution 1457 (2003), operative para. 4; and Resolution 1521 
(2003), operative para. 13.
49) UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), 17 March 2011, Annex II.
50) The measures are formulated as encouragements and not as hard legal obligations. 
However, due to the close connection between these measures and sanctions imposed against 
natural resources, they are to be regarded as imperative in nature. For examples, see section 4.2 
of this article.
51) On diamonds, see UN SC Resolution 1306 (2000) for Sierra Leone and UN SC 
Resolution 1343 (2001) for Liberia. On timber, see UN Security Council Resolution 1521 (2003) 
on Liberia.
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4.3. Appraisal of the Current Legal Framework for Resource Exploitation in 
Situations of Internal Armed Conflict
It may be concluded from the above that the current regulatory framework deal-
ing with the exploitation of natural resources by parties to an armed conflict is 
very fragmented. The prohibitions contained in international humanitarian law 
apply first and foremost to rebel groups, while States derive their obligations 
mostly from peacetime law.
In addition, the existing regulatory framework provides major loopholes for 
parties to an armed conflict. Examples of such loopholes include the definition of 
military necessity in relation to the prohibition on the destruction or seizure of 
the property of an adversary as well as the determination of what constitutes “for 
the benefit of the population” in relation to the exercise of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources.
Related to these loopholes is the concern of legal uncertainty. The rules are not 
tailored to cover the specific situation of predatory resource exploitation. In the 
near absence of relevant case law, it is therefore extremely difficult to provide 
guidance in respect of the precise scope and contents of the rules in relation to 
the issue of predatory resource exploitation.
The judgment of the International Court of Justice in the DR Congo-Uganda 
case, which legally qualified the illicit exploitation of Congolese natural resources 
by Ugandan troops, may therefore be welcomed. This is especially so since the ICJ 
is the only international court which has explicitly addressed the issue of preda-
tory resource exploitation in modern armed conflicts. However, this judgment 
touches upon some of the issues only. There is thus an urgent need to clarify the 
existing rules, both through case law and through codification and progressive 
development of these rules.
5. Security Council Sanctions Regimes
This section examines some of the sanctions regimes imposed by the Security 
Council in order to break the link between natural resources exploitation and the 
continuation of armed conflicts. The purpose of this section is twofold. First, it 
assesses the extent to which the sanctions regimes imposed by the Security 
Council provide a practical response to the imperfections of the regulatory frame-
work discussed in the previous sections. Second, it assesses the role played by the 
Security Council in addressing the link between natural resources and armed 
conflict.
5.1. General Remarks on Resource-Related Sanctions
Sanctions are one of the most important tools of the UN Security Council to 
address threats to international peace and security. Pursuant to Article 41 of the 
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UN Charter, the Security Council is entitled to take measures not involving the use 
of military force to maintain or restore international peace and security. The 
Council may do so in all phases of the conflict, once it has determined the exist-
ence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression under 
Article 39 of the UN Charter.
Measures taken by the Security Council under Article 41 of the UN Charter pre-
vail over the obligations of UN Member States under treaties to which they are 
party.52 For present purposes, this implies that Security Council sanctions may, for 
example, further restrict the rights of parties to an armed conflict under interna-
tional humanitarian law. Likewise – and of the utmost importance for the cases 
discussed below – Security Council sanctions may qualify the right of a State to 
exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural resources if necessary to maintain 
or restore international peace and security.
Sanctions addressing predatory resource exploitation have generally targeted 
the trade in natural resources from regions where these natural resources have 
fuelled armed conflicts. In most cases, the Security Council has established Panels 
of Experts to make a factual assessment of the situation before imposing sanc-
tions. Panel reports have extensively documented the role that natural resources 
played in the conflicts discussed in this article. In addition, their findings concern-
ing the breaking of sanctions in particular conflicts, such as those in Angola and 
Sierra Leone, have been instrumental in the Security Council’s embracing of new 
approaches to tackle the trade in ‘conflict resources’, such as through the Kimberley 
Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds.53
Some of the sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council in order to 
break the link between natural resources and armed conflict have directly 
add ressed the trade in particular natural resources, while other sanctions 
regimes have rather targeted persons or entities involved in resource exploitation. 
Relevant examples of commodity sanctions include the diamond sanctions 
discussed below. Relevant examples of targeted sanctions include the asset 
freeze and travel ban targeting individuals or entities supporting armed 
groups in the DR Congo through illicit trade in natural resources”54 and the 
asset freeze against the Libyan National Oil Company during the 2011 Libyan 
civil war.55
This section focuses on two examples of structural approaches adopted by the 
Security Council in order to break the link between natural resources and armed 
conflict: certificate of origin schemes for particular commodities, and reform 
plans for the natural resources sector. In both cases, the Security Council has con-
52) Article 103 of the UN Charter determines that in the event of a conflict between the obliga-
tions of Members of the United Nations under the UN Charter and their obligations under any 
other treaty, their obligations under the Charter prevail.
53) See Section 4.2 for more details.
54) UN Security Council Resolution 1857 (2008), operative paragraph 4(g).
55) UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), supra note 46.
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ditioned the lifting of sanctions upon the effective implementation of these 
measures.
In practice, the Security Council has resorted to the imposition of resource 
related sanctions in the phase of conflict resolution and has maintained these in 
the early stages of post-conflict reconstruction. The two approaches discussed 
in the current section are representative of the steps taken by the Security Council 
in this regard. Certification schemes are usually introduced in the phase of con-
flict resolution, while reform plans are generally introduced in the phase of 
post-conflict reconstruction.
5.2. Certificate of Origin Schemes
Certificate of origin schemes seek to prevent the trade in natural resources from 
fuelling armed conflict by providing a certificate for natural resources from which 
their origin can be established. To date there have been four instances in which 
the Security Council has turned to a certificate of origin scheme to exempt par-
ticular natural resources from a sanctions regime it has adopted. All address the 
trade in rough diamonds.
The first time the Security Council referred to a certificate of origin regime was 
in relation to the conflict in Angola. The diamond trade constituted one of the 
primary sources of income for the rebel movement UNITA. In order to end the 
violence in Angola, the Security Council decided in Resolution 1173 (1998) that all 
States must take the necessary measures “to prohibit the direct or indirect import 
from Angola to their territory of all diamonds that are not controlled through the 
Certificate of Origin regime of the [Angolan government]”.56 In a subsequent reso-
lution, the Security Council specified that the implementation of the measures 
contained in resolution 1173 requires “an effective Certificate of Origin regime”.57
Also in relation to Sierra Leone, the Security Council installed a sanctions 
regime on all rough diamonds and requested the government of Sierra Leone “to 
ensure, as a matter of urgency, that an effective Certificate of Origin regime for 
trade in diamonds is in operation in Sierra Leone” which would exempt 
diamonds traded through this regime from the measures.58 In subsequent resolu-
tions, the Security Council renewed the diamond sanctions but exempted dia-
monds controlled by the Certificate of Origin Regime that the govern ment  had 
put in place, to wit, the Kimberley Process certification scheme.59 The sanctions 
56) Security Council Resolution 1173 (1998), operative para. 12(b).
57) Security Council Resolution 1295 (2000), operative para. 16.
58) Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), operative paras. 1, 2 and 5.
59) See Resolutions 1385 (2001) and 1446 (2002) for the extensions of the diamond sanctions. 
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is a voluntary mechanism to stop the trade in 
roughdiamonds that are used by non-State armed groups to finance their armed struggle. It 
was set up in 2002 by States, the diamond industry and non-governmental organisations in 
response to calls by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council for an international 
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were finally lifted in 2003 in light of the government’s “increased efforts to 
control and manage its diamond industry and ensure proper control over dia-
mond mining areas, and the Government’s full participation in the Kimberley 
Process”.60
The third instance concerns the imposition of diamond sanctions against 
Liberia, principally to address the role of Liberia in the smuggling of Sierra 
Leonean diamonds.61 The Security Council demanded that the government of 
Liberia “cease all direct or indirect import of Sierra Leone rough diamonds which 
are not controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime of the Government of 
Sierra Leone” and called upon the government “to establish an effective Certificate 
of Origin regime for trade in rough diamonds that is transparent and internation-
ally verifiable”.62
In subsequent resolutions, adopted in the phase of post-conflict reconstruc-
tion, the Security Council went a step further. In Resolution 1478 (2003), the 
Security Council called upon the Liberian government “to establish a Certificate 
of Origin regime for Liberian rough diamonds that is transparent, internationally 
verifiable and fully compatible with the Kimberley Process”.63 In a later resolution, 
the Security Council reiterated its call upon the government and encouraged it “to 
take steps to join the Kimberley Process as soon as possible”.64
Finally, in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the Security Council installed a sanctions 
regime targeting the whole diamond industry in Côte d’Ivoire.65 These sanctions 
were imposed upon the request of the Ivorian government, which had already 
imposed a national ban on the export of diamonds in order to take away from the 
opposition forces their principal source of funding.66 In the same resolution, 
the Security Council expressly referred to the Kimberley Process. It welcomed 
the measures agreed by participants in the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme to prevent the export of all rough diamonds from the territory of Côte 
d’Ivoire and called upon the States in the region which are not participants in 
the Kimberley Process “to intensify their efforts to join the Kimberley Process in 
order to increase the effectiveness of monitoring the import of diamonds from 
Côte d’Ivoire”.67
certification scheme for rough diamonds. See e.g. UN General Assembly Resolution 55/56 of 29 
January 2001. For more details on this Certification Scheme, see <www.kimberleyprocess.
com/>, visited on 30 July 2012.
60) See UN Doc. SC/7778 of 5 June 2003 for a press statement by the president of the Security 
Council.
61) UN Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001), operative para. 6.
62) Ibid., operative paras. 2(c) and 15.
63) UN Security Council Resolution 1478 (2003), para. 13.
64) UN Security Council Resolution 1521 (2003), operative paras. 7 and 9.
65) UN Security Council Resolution 1643 (2005), operative para. 6.
66) Report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1584 
(2005), UN Doc. S/2005/699, para. 48.
67) UN Security Council Resolution 1643 (2005), operative para. 6.
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In response to political changes that took place in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011, the 
Security Council offered the Ivorian government an opportunity for the modifica-
tion or lifting of sanctions. The Security Council conditioned the modification or 
lifting of the sanctions on the creation and implementation of an action plan by 
the Ivorian authorities to enforce the Kimberley Process rules in Côte d’Ivoire.68 A 
further condition stipulated that the authorities “closely work with the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme to conduct a review and assessment of Côte d’Ivoire’s 
internal controls system for trade in rough diamonds and a comprehensive 
geologic study of Côte d’Ivoire’s potential diamond resources and production 
capacity”.69
These resolutions reveal a growing tendency of the Security Council to use 
sanctions as a tool to provide structural solutions to break the link between natu-
ral resources and armed conflict. First of all, the resolutions develop standards for 
a certificate of origin scheme. In its resolutions concerning Angola and Sierra 
Leone, the Security Council asked for an effective regime to be set up. In its resolu-
tions against Liberia, the Security Council elaborated upon this requirement by 
demanding that the Certificate of Origin regime must be transparent and interna-
tionally verifiable.
In addition, the Security Council has increasingly relied upon one particular 
certificate of origin scheme, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Whereas 
in earlier resolutions the Council refers to the Kimberley Process as a model for an 
effective certificate of origin scheme, in later resolutions it refers to the Kimberley 
Process as the only viable option.
5.3. Reform Plans for Natural Resources Sectors
The Security Council has also used its powers under Chapter VII to set out reforms 
for particular natural resource sectors. The Liberian timber industry may serve as 
a primary example. After the diamond sanctions had been installed against 
Liberia, the government led by Charles Taylor increasingly resorted to logging as a 
means of generating revenue in order to finance the armed conflict in the region. 
Therefore, the Security Council called upon the government of Liberia to “take 
urgent steps, including through the establishment of transparent and internation-
ally verifiable audit regimes, to ensure that revenue derived by the Government of 
Liberia from the … Liberian timber industry is used for legitimate social, humani-
tarian and development purposes”.70 Having no effect, the Security Council 
decided in a subsequent resolution to impose sanctions on Liberian timber.71
68) UN Security Council Resolution 2045 (2012), operative para. 6.
69) Ibid., operative para. 21.
70) UN Security Council Resolution 1408 (2002), operative para. 10.
 71) UN Security Council Resolution 1478 (2003), operative para. 16.
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After Charles Taylor had been ousted from power, these sanctions remained in 
place as part of the post-conflict reconstruction phase. In Resolution 1521 (2003), 
the Security Council urged the government of Liberia “to establish its full author-
ity and control over the timber producing areas, and to take all necessary steps to 
ensure that government revenues from the Liberian timber industry are not used 
to fuel conflict or otherwise in violation of the Council’s resolutions but are used 
for legitimate purposes for the benefit of the Liberian people, including develop-
ment”.72 It also encouraged the government “to establish oversight mechanisms 
for the timber industry that will promote responsible business practices, and to 
establish transparent accounting and auditing mechanisms to ensure that all gov-
ernment revenues … are not used to fuel conflict or otherwise in violation of the 
Council’s resolutions but are used for legitimate purposes for the benefit of the 
Liberian people, including development”.73 Moreover, these objectives include 
“the promotion of responsible and environmentally sustainable business prac-
tices in the timber industry”.74
In order to implement the measures set out in resolution 1521 (2003), the 
Liberian government developed two programmes with the aid of other States and 
international organisations. The first concerns the Liberia Forest Initiative, aimed 
at improving transparency and accountability for timber revenues as well as sus-
tainable forest management.75 The second programme, the Governance and 
Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), has a more general scope 
and is aimed at improving transparency and accountability in government reve-
nues and expenditure.76
In Resolution 1647 (2005), the Security Council embraced both programmes. 
With respect to the forest initiative, the Security Council considered that its imple-
mentation would “ensure transparency, accountability and sustainable forest 
management and contribute towards the lifting of the measures on timber in 
accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 of resolution 1521 (2003)”.77 Likewise, the 
Security Council encouraged the government of Liberia to implement the 
Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program which would “expe-
dite the lifting of the measures imposed by resolution 1521 (2003)”.78
These resolutions reveal a tendency of the Security Council to expand its tasks 
with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. The resolu-
tions in relation to Liberia go far beyond direct crisis management. The Security 
72) UN Security Council Resolution 1521 (2003), para. 11.
73) Ibid., para. 13.
74) Ibid., para. 15.
75) For more information on this initiative, see the website of the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization, at <www.fao.org/forestry/lfi/en/>, visited on 30 January 2012.
76) The GEMAP document is available through the website of the World Bank, at <siteresources 
.worldbank.org/LIBERIAEXTN/Resources/GEMAP.pdf>, visited on 30 January 2012.
77) UN Security Council Resolution 1647 (2005), operative para. 3.
78) UN Security Council Resolution 1647 (2005), operative para. 4.
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Council asks for great structural reforms and makes the lifting of sanctions condi-
tional upon effective implementation of these reforms. In addition, it sets all kinds 
of requirements with respect to the contents and objectives of these reform 
programmes. The programmes must establish transparent and internationally 
verifiable audit regimes; they must promote responsible and environmentally sus-
tainable business practices; and they must ensure that government revenues are 
used for legitimate social, humanitarian and development purposes for the bene-
fit of the Liberian people. In this way, the Security Council has contributed in a 
more structural way to efforts of peace-building in Liberia, ensuring that Liberian 
natural resources are managed in a sustainable way for the purpose of develop-
ment rather than conflict.
6. Adequacy of the Overall Legal Framework
This article has examined the role played by current international law in address-
ing the problem of predatory resource exploitation by parties to an armed con-
flict. It has discussed the regulatory framework applicable to the exploitation of 
natural resources in internal armed conflicts and has examined the practice of the 
Security Council in relation to armed conflicts fuelled through resource revenues. 
In particular, it has analysed two of the more systematic approaches of the 
Council’s recent sanctions regimes to break the link between natural resources 
and armed conflict.
From the analysis above it is clear that the current regulatory framework for the 
exploitation of natural resources during internal armed conflicts is fragmented. 
International humanitarian law deals principally with obligations for rebel groups, 
while States derive most of their obligations from peacetime law. Especially rele-
vant in this regard are international environmental, human rights and general 
international law. This fragmentation of obligations under international law cre-
ates uncertainties with regard to the applicable law.
In addition to being fragmented, the current regulatory framework is imprecise, 
leading to uncertainties regarding the interpretation of the obligations them-
selves. Notions such as ‘military necessity’, the distinction between exploitation 
for public and for private purposes and a determination of what constitutes 
exploitation “for the benefit of the population” create uncertainties with regard to 
the substantive obligations of parties to an armed conflict.
Uncertainties within the regulatory framework, whether they result from ques-
tions concerning the applicable law or from the nature and scope of the substan-
tive obligations, are problematic in situations of armed conflict. These situations 
call for clear and unequivocal rules for both sides to the conflict. This would 
increase the likelihood of the parties to an armed conflict respecting the rules. 
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In order to address these inadequacies, the existing legal framework thus needs to 
be clarified and, preferably, expanded.
As discussed above, the Security Council has found ways to address the prob-
lem of predatory resource exploitation in a more structural way in the past dec-
ades through the use of sanctions and, in particular, by tying the modification or 
lifting of sanctions to the implementation of certificate of origin regimes and 
reform plans for particular natural resources sectors. One of the advantages of 
sanctions regimes is that these can be imposed against all parties to an armed 
conflict, without touching directly upon questions concerning the legality of 
resource exploitation. There may, for example, be good reasons for the Security 
Council to impose sanctions upon a party to an armed conflict, while the resource 
exploitation itself is perfectly legal. In addition, the prospect of the lifting of sanc-
tions may pose an incentive to States to engage in structural reforms of their natu-
ral resource sectors. These structural reforms not only reduce the likelihood for 
that country to relapse into conflict but they may also help to turn natural 
resources into an engine for sustainable development.
In sum, it is only through a combination of different approaches that the link 
between the exploitation of natural resources and armed conflict can properly be 
addressed. The sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council may provide 
solutions to particular instances where natural resources are used to fund an 
armed conflict. One of the most important advantages of sanctions regimes is that 
they can be tailored to address specific situations. Nonetheless, dealing with the 
issue of predatory resource exploitation in such an ad hoc manner is not sufficient. 
It is also of the utmost importance to provide parties to an armed conflict with 
clear rules to which they can adhere. This may not, in itself, put an end to the 
exploitation of natural resources for the purposes of funding an armed conflict. 
However, in the long run, it may significantly enhance the possibilities of turning 
natural resources from engines for conflict into engines for sustainable 
development.

